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PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE
I. PRETRIAL
A. Dicovery
Proctor v. Corley1 has helped to clear the confusion surround-
ing discovery in South Carolina. The defendant obtained an
order under section 26-701 of the South Carolina Code requiring
a witness to appear for pretrial examination. The plaintiff
objected on the ground that the examination by the defendant
was not required under section 26-701. The circuit court dis-
missed the clerk's order and the defendant appealed.
Citing Meaurin v. "Wilson,2 the court first made it clear that
depositions taken under sections 26-701 through 26-703 of the
Code are distinct from testimony de bene esse provided for in
sections 26-704 through 26-709. Examination de lene esse pro-
vides for the preservation of evidence, a use inconsistent with
later viva voce examination.
Under section 26-701 the testimony of any witness could be
taken. In addition, the deposition could be read into evidence
at the trial and this would not preclude viva voce examination
of the witness if either party desired it.
The circuit court had dismissed the clerk's order on the
ground that the defendant had not shown good and sufficient
cause for examining the witness under section 26-503 of the
Code. The supreme court held that this section was meant to
apply only to the examination of adverse parties, and an ad-
verse party is not a witness within the meaning of section 26-
701. The defendant's application for the order was the only
showing contemplated by the terms of the statute which provide
that the examination of the witness be "required by the party
making such application."
B. Change of Venue
During the survey period the South Carolina Supreme Court
considered the question of change of venue in three cases. In
Cavalier v. Corley3 the court restated the established principle
that the granting of a motion for change of venue on grounds
of convenience of witnesses and promotion of justice is within
1. 246 S.C. 478, 144 S.E.2d 285 (1965).
2. 16 S.C. 402 (1882).
3. 247 S.C. 509, 148 S.E.2d 372 (1966).
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the discretion of the trial judge and will not be disturbed on
appeal where no clear showing of abuse of discretion is made.
The appellant's argument, based on older cases, was rejected in
favor of the controlling decisions of recent cases.
Harmon v. Graham4 presented a question of first impression
in this state. The defendant served upon the plaintiff a motion
for change of venue pursuant to section 10-303 of the South
Carolina Code. The same day, the defendant, "not waiving but
specifically reserving all rights under his motion for a change
of venue heretofore served," 5 served an answer and counter-
claim on the plaintiff. The change of venue was granted and
the plaintiff appealed contending that the defendant had waived
his right to a change of venue when he asserted a counterclaim.
The court unanimously affirmed the change of venue saying
that it would be an anomaly to hold that the defendant could
not assert his right under section 10-705 of the Code without
waiving his right under section 10-303, which right was ex-
pressly reserved. In support of its decision the court quoted
from Corpus Juris Secundum6 and cited a Texas case7 and a
California case,8 both clearly in point.
In Miller v. Miller,9 the defendant made a motion for change
of venue which made it necessary for the trial court to make a
finding as to the defendant's place of residence at the time the
action was instituted. The supreme court restated the well set-
tled principle that the issue of residence is a question of fact,
and its determination by the trial judge is conclusive unless
without evidentiary support. In determining domicil the court
will give decisive weight to the act and intent rather than the
duration of residence. This, too, is settled law.
C. Nonsuit Prior to Joinder
In KTopf v. Enopf,1° the court held that denial of the plain-
tiff's motion to discontinue his action before the issues had been
joined was an abuse of discretion, in the absence of resulting
prejudice to the defendant. The plaintiff has the right to dis-
4. 247 S.C. 54, 145 S.E.2d 521 (1965).
5. Id. at 55-56, 145 S.E.2d at 521.
6. 92 C.J.S. Venue § 217 (1955).
7. Hickman v. Swain, 106 Tex. 431, 167 S.W. 209 (1914).
8. Goss v. Brown, 64 Cal. App. 381, 221 Pac. 683 (1923).
9. 248 S.C. 125, 149 S.E.2d 336 (1966).
10. 247 S.C. 378, 147 S.E.2d 638 (1966).
1967] '
2
South Carolina Law Review, Vol. 19, Iss. 1 [1967], Art. 12
https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol19/iss1/12
SOUTH CAROLINA LAW RVIEW
continue any action commenced by him where it will not result
in legal prejudice to the defendant. In this case the plaintiff
brought an action for divorce against his wife. Before the
issue was joined, he served a motion for an order of dismissal
to be heard on the fourth day after service. Pending the hear-
ing of this motion, the wife filed an answer to the complaint.
The court quoted from Krause v. Borjessan11 a Washington
case, which held that the right to a voluntary nonsuit is fixed
at the time it is claimed. Thus a defendant cannot thereafter
claim a setoff or seek affirmative relief as a means of prevent-
ing the granting of the nonsuit.
II. TRUL
A. Evidence
The opinion in Johnson v. Finney12 helps lay to rest the term
"scintilla of evidence" in South Carolina by following the recent
trend in avoiding that language. The ordinary meaning of the
scintilla rule is that if there is the slightest trace of evidence
presenting a conflict the case must be submitted to the jury.-1
This doctrine has now been generally rejected. 14 As used by
the South Carolina courts, a scintilla of evidence is any material
evidence that, if true, would tend to establish the issue in the
mind of a reasonable juror.15 This is obviously not a true
"scintilla" of evidence, and use of the word "scintilla" only
serves to confuse the issue. For that reason, it has fallen into
disuse in recent years.
The test that has been applied in place of the scintilla rule is
the one used in Johnson va. Finney. The court stated that if
more than one reasonable inference can be drawn the case must
be submitted to the jury, but if the evidence is susceptible of
only one reasonable inference the question is one of law for the
court. This is substantially the same test as that of the scintilla
rule as used in South Carolina, but avoids use of the confusing
term "scintilla." The test in Johnson has been used before and
is well established law in South Carolina."
11. 55 Wash. 2d 284, 347 P.2d 893 (1959).
12. 246 S.C. 366, 143 S.E.2d 722 (1965).
13. 53 Am. JuR. Trial § 356 (1945).
14. Ibid.
15. See, e.g., Cook v. Norwood, 217 S.C. 383, 60 S.E.2d 695 (1950) ; Moorer
v. Dowling, 216 S.C. 456, 58 S.E.2d 734 (1950).
16. Cf. West v. Sowell, 237 S.C. 641, 118 S.E2d 692 (1961).
[Vol. 19
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B. Jury Trial
The court in Family Loan Co. v. Surratt17 held that a party
who agrees to reference to a master of all issues in an action
waives any right to a jury trial. In this case the defendant con-
sented to an order of reference containing a preliminary recital
that the issues had been joined and that "the same is an equity
matter and ought to be referred." The complaint clearly alleged
the right to no relief other than recovery of the amount due on
the contract under consideration. Thus, as the supreme court
pointed out, the pleader had erroneously characterized the
action as one in equity. Nevertheless, the order having been
referred to him, the master recommended that judgment be
entered against the defendant for the amount due on the con-
tract, and it was so entered. The defendant contended that he
was entitled to a jury trial on the legal issue. But the court held
that having consented to a general order of reference, the
defendant cannot later be heard to complain that he was entitled
to some other mode of trial.
C. Motions for Directed Verdict and Nonsuit
In Ralston Purina Go. v. O'Dell' the plaintiff sued the de-
fendant, O'Dell, to recover for goods and merchandise sold him.
Three others were joined as defendants as they had allegedly
guaranteed payment. During trial the plaintiff moved for a
voluntary nonsuit against the three guarantors, which was
denied. At the close of testimony an involuntary nonsuit was
granted as to the three alleged guarantors, and the plaintiff's
motion for a directed verdict was denied. The action had been
brought for a sum in excess of 9,000 dollars, but the jury
returned a verdict against O'Dell for only 4,000 dollars. The
plaintiff moved for judgment n.o.v. in the full amount, but this
motion was also denied. The supreme court held that the trial
judge erred in not granting the plaintiff's motion for directed
verdict against O'Dell. The only inference that could be drawn
from the evidence was that he was indebted to the plaintiff for
the whole amount. Where the evidence is susceptible of only
one reasonable inference, the court should decide the question as
one of law.'19
17. 248 S.C. 113, 149 S.E2d 334 (1966).
18. 248 S.C. 37, 148 S.E.2d 736 (1966).
19. Id. at 41, 148 S.E.2d at 737. The court cited Skipper v. Hartley, 242
S.C. 221, 130 S.E.2d 486 (1963).
1967]
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The trial judge also erred in refusing to grant the plaintiff's
motion for voluntary nonsuit against the three guarantors. The
rule in South Carolina is that a plaintiff is entitled to a volun-
tary nonsuit without prejudice as a matter of right unless there
is a showing of legal prejudice to the defendant. Such prejudice
does not arise from the fact that granting the plaintiff's motion
would impose upon the defendant the necessity of defending
another suit. The court cited Gulledge v. Young20 in support
of the proposition that the trial judge has no discretion with
respect to the granting of a motion for voluntary nonsuit unless
and until legal prejudice is shown. In that event the matter
becomes one of discretion for the trial judge.
In Able v. Travelers In. Co.,21 the defendant had insured
Able against accidental bodily injury. Able, a policeman, died
from a cerebral hemorrhage shortly after suffering a fall while
chasing a man in an attempt to arrest him. The defendant
refused to make any payments to Able's widow, the beneficiary
under the policy, on the ground that Able died of illness rather
than by accident. The jury found for the defendant. The plain-
tiff excepted to the denial of her motion for a new trial and
alleged error in the charge to the jury.
The court held that, under South Carolina Circuit Court Rule
No. 76, the alleged lack of evidentiary support for the verdict
should first have been presented by a motion for a directed
verdict.
As to the second exception, after charging the jury, the trial
judge, as required by section 10-210 of the South Carolina Code,
asked the plaintiff's counsel if he wished to request any addi-
tional instructions or take any exception to the charge as given.
He replied in the negative. The court held that in the absence
of an exception at the trial, the plaintiff could not thereafter
challenge the charge on appeal.
The court in Evans v. Wabash Life Ins. C0. 22 reached a deci-
sion similar to the one in Able2 3 based on Circuit Court Rule
No. 76. Here the defendant made a motion to strike certain
allegations from the complaint at the close of the plaintiff's
testimony and failed to renew its motion or move for a directed
verdict after presenting its own evidence. This failure precluded
20. 242 S.C. 287, 130 S.E.2d 695 (1963).
21. 248 S.C. 101, 149 S.E.2d 262 (1966).
22. 247 S.C. 464, 148 S.E2d 153 (1966).
23. Able v. Travelers Ins. Co., 248 S.C. 101, 149 S.E.2d 262 (1966).
[Vol. 19
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a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence on appeal. In
addition, the court stated that when the defendant presented
evidence, it lost the opportunity to have the trial judge's refusal
of its motion reviewed in the light of the plaintiff's evidence
alone. This is settled law in South Carolina.
D. New Trial
In Stric and v. Pinoe,2 4 an action arising out of an auto-
mobile accident, the plaintiff received a verdict in the amount
of 7,750 dollars, of which 608.15 dollars was admittedly for
property damage. The remainder was awarded for damages
resulting from injury to his nervous system although there was
no physical impact on his person. The defendant moved for a
new trial nisi. The trial judge granted a new trial unless the
plaintiff remitted all the damages in excess of the 608.15 dollars
property damage. Instead of remitting, the plaintiff appealed.
The court held that since the plaintiff did not remit in accord-
ance with the order granting a new trial nisi, the effect of the
order was to grant a new trial absolute. The South Carolina
Supreme Court interpreted the trial judge's order as one based
upon a consideration of the evidence resulting in a conclusion
contrary to the one reached by the jury with respect to the ele-
ments of damage. An order for a new trial based upon such
considerations is not appealable. This is settled law in South
Carolina.
Gray v. Davis2 5 was also an action for personal injury and
property damage sustained in an automobile collision. The jury
returned a verdict in the amount of 7,000 dollars actual and 500
dollars punitive damages. The defendant moved for a new trial
on the grounds that the verdict was the result of prejudice,
caprice or passion and not founded on the evidence or, in the
alternative, was unduly liberal. The Court found no merit in the
defendant's first contention.
As to the second contention, it must clearly appear that the
trial judge abused his discretion before the court will disturb
his decision on a new trial motion. The trial judge's statement
that the award of only 500 dollars punitive damages was indica-
tive of lack of prejudice in the minds of the jurors was not error.
In the case of Jennings v. Mcowan26 quoted in the instant case,
24. 247 S.C. 497, 148 S.E.2d 161 (1966).
25. 247 S.C. 536, 148 S.E.2d 682 (1966).
26. 215 S.C. 404, 55 S.E.2d 522 (1949).
19671
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the court said that a relatively small amount of punitive dam-
ages would tend to negate any idea of passion or prejudice.
E. Judgment Non Obstante Veredicto After Mistrial
In Groom v. Zander,27 the South Carolina Supreme Court
held that a lower court lacks jurisdiction to entertain a post
trial motion for judgment n.o.v. in the case of mistrial. The
defendant made timely motions for a nonsuit and a directed
verdict, and the trial judge withheld his rulings as to both. The
case was submitted to the jury, and when they failed to reach
a verdict the judge declared a mistrial and discharged the
jurors. Before recessing, he agreed to preserve the defendant's
rights under its motions and later heard the motion for a
directed verdict and granted it. This was a novel question in
South Carolina, and on appeal, the South Carolina Supreme
Court reversed. It stated that the trial judge could not direct a
verdict after a mistrial because there was no jury to which this
instruction for the defendant could be given. If the request is
considered as a motion for judgment notwithstanding the fail-
ure of the jury to agree upon a verdict, the result is unchanged.
Circuit Court Rule No. 79, which provides for judgment n.o.v.,
states, "Such motion . .. must be made after reception of the
verdict .... " Since no verdict was returned there could be no
judgment n.o.v.
Courts elsewhere have taken the opposite view on this ques-
tion. The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure allow a party to
renew his motion for a directed verdict if the jury fails to
agree.28 A number of states have similar rules. For example,
Idaho has adopted this section of the Federal Rules, 29 Arizona
has a statute which permits judgment n.o.v. after mistrials,30
Georgia has a motion for judgment notwithstanding the mis-
trial,31 and Texas case law allows the trial court, on reconsid-
eration, to sustain a motion for instructed verdict even after the
jury fails to agree.3 2 This would seem to be the better rule.
27. 246 S.C. 512, 144 S.E.2d 909 (1965).
28. FED. R. Crv. P. 50(b).
29. Pigg v. Brockman, 85 Idaho 492, __, 381 P2d 286, 289 (1963).
30. Watterson v. Superior Court, 91 Ariz. 11, 368 P.2d 756 (1962).
31. Smith v. Francis, 221 Ga. 260, 144 S.E.2d 439 (1965).
32. Hutchinson v. Texas Aluminum Co., 330 S.W.2d 895, 897 (Tex. Civ.
App. 1959).
[Vol. 19
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II. APPEAL AND EROR
A. Supreme Court Rules
In Pacific Ins. Co. v. Fireman's Fund Ins. Co.,38 the court
stated that even though it would be justified in dismissing the
appeal for failure of the appellant's brief to comply with South
Carolina Supreme Court Rule No. 8, Section 3, it would review
the case where the basic issue involved was one of sufficient
importance to the bar and bench of the state to warrant a deci-
sion thereon. This clarifies the statement in United States Fid.
and Guar. Co. v. First Nat'l Bank3 4
In this case we would be fully justified in dismissing the
entire appeal for failure to comply with the last cited rule,
but refrain from doing so because no previous decision has
come to our attention wherein this court has passed upon
the effect of failure to comply with Section 3 of Rule 8.
United States Fid. and Guar. Co. left the effect of Section 3 of
Rule No. 8 still in question. Pacific Ins. makes it clear that the
penalty for failure to comply with that section will be dis-
missal of the appeal unless the issue involved is of sufficient
importance to the bar and bench of the state to warrant a deci-
sion thereon.
Section 6 of Supreme Court Rule No. 4 was considered in
two cases. In Solley v. Veaver, 5 the sole exception as stated
by the appellant was that, "the Court erred in granting De-
fendant's Motion for nonsuit because there was more than one
reasonable inference properly deducible from the testimony of
negligence on the part of the Defendant."
The court held that this exception violated Rule No. 4, Sec-
tion 6, in that it was entirely too general, vague and indefinite
to be considered. In order to avoid being too general the excep-
tion should have pointed out a specific issue of fact which
should have been submitted to the jury.
In Boyer v. Loftin-Woodard, Inc.$6 the exceptions complained
that the trial judge had erred in granting the defendant's
motion for judgment n.o.v. because (1) reasonable inference
33. 247 S.C. 282, 147 S.E.2d 273 (1966).
34. 244 S.C. 436, 442, 137 S.E.2d 582, 584 (1964).
35. 247 S.C. 129, 131, 146 S.E.2d 164, 165 (1966).
36. 247 S.C. 167, 146 S.E.2d 606 (1966) ; For a more detailed discussion of
this case and related cases, see Comment, 18 S.C.L. Rxv. 307 (1966).
1967]
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could be drawn that the negligence of the defendant was the
proximate cause of the accident, (2) it was not necessary to
build inference upon inference to establish liability, and (3) the
evidence presented a question of fact for the jury.37 The court
held that the exceptions were entirely too general, vague and
indefinite to be considered on appeal, citing South Carolina
Supreme Court Rule No. 4, Section 6.
B. Time for Appeal
In Braun v. City of Airmen,38 the appellants received a signed
order and letter from the trial judge on March 3, denying their
motion for judgment n.o.v. or a new trial. On March 25, the
appellants served a notice of intention to appeal from the order.
The appeal was dismissed under section 7405 of the South Caro-
lina Code which requires notice of appeal within ten days after
receipt of notice that the order has been granted. The appellants
contended that the ten day period had not commenced to run
since notice had not been given to them by the prevailing party.
The South Carolina Supreme Court held that there was no
requirement that a written notice of judgment be given to the
appealing party by the prevailing party and therefore the 10
day period had run against the appellants.
C. Mootness
In Fabliars Uptown Charleston, Inc. v. South Carolina Tax
Comni'),39 the plaintiff's suit to enjoin enforcement of a rule
prohibiting quantity discounts in sale of liquor by wholesalers
was rendered moot when the plaintiff went out of business and
surrendered its retail liquor license. The South Carolina Su-
preme Court will not pass on moot or academic questions or
make an adjudication where no actual controversy remains.
D. Jurisdiction to Consider Evidence
Dunn v. Miller 9 stands for the proposition that, in an equity
case, if the factual findings of the master and the circuit judge
are in sharp disagreement on the material issues, the supreme
37. Id. at 170, 146 S.E.2d at 607.
38. 247 S.C. 18, 145 S.E.2d 423 (1965).
39. 247 S.C. 164, 146 S.E.2d 608 (1966).
40. 147 S.C. 567, 148 S.E.2d 676 (1966).
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court has jurisdiction to consider the evidence and findings of
fact in accordance with its view of the preponderance or greater
weight of the evidence.
E. Weight of Evidence
In Grier v. Cornelius41 and Crider v. Infinger T'ansp. Co.,
42
the court held that in reviewing the decision of the trial court
on a motion for a directed verdict followed by a motion for
judgment n.o.v., it would consider the evidence in the light most
favorable to the non-moving party. Stronger language appeared
in Grier, where the court held that under such circumstances
it, "must adopt the view of the evidence most favorable to the
verdict and give it the strongest probative force of which it will
admit."
43
F. Law of the Case
In Telbom v. Page,44 the court stated that conclusions of a
special referee must be challenged by the proper exceptions in
order to be considered and overruled by the circuit judge. Oth-
erwise these conclusions would become the law of the case and,
thus, not subject to challenge in any further action.
G. Interlocutory Appeal
In Wallace v. Interamercan Trust Co. 45 the court denied an
interlocutory appeal made by the defendant from an order
requiring the production of books and records of the corpora-
tion involved in a stockholder's derivative action for the exami-
nation, inspection and audit by the plaintiffs in preparation
for trial. The order was made under sections 26-502 and 12-16.26
of the South Carolina Code. Section 15-123 of the Code pro-
vides that appeal from an interlocutory order will not lie before
final judgment unless it is one involving the merits or affecting
a substantial right. This order did not determine any issues in
the case but was simply made to promote a proper and expedi-
tious trial of the merits. Therefore, the court held that a dis-
41. 247 S.C. 521, 148 S.E.2d 338 (1966).
42. 248 S.C. 10, 148 S.E2d 732 (1966).
43. 247 S.C. 521, 532, 148 S.E.2d 338, 343 (1966).
44. 247 S.C. 554, 148 S.E.2d 375 (1966).
45. 246 S.C. 563, 144 S.E.2d 813 (1965).
19671
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cretionary order issued under sections 26-502 and 12-16.26 is not
appealable before final judgment.
In Mason v. S.S. Kresge C0. 4 1 the South Carolina Supreme
Court stated that it is now well settled that an order granting
or denying a motion to make a pleading more definite and cer-
tain is not appealable until final judgment unless the motion
goes to the merits of the case. The motion involves the merits
where incorrectly granting or denying it would deprive a party
of a substantial right.
H. Miscellaneous
In Coker v. United Ins. Co. of America,47 the plaintiff did
not except to the conclusion of the trial judge that the appli-
cable statute of limitations had been tolled. Thus, the question
of the correctness of the ruling was not before the supreme
court for decision on appeal.
G. GoiwoN IoRR ox
46. 247 S.C. 144, 146 S.E.2d 158 (1966).
47. 247 S.C. 271, 146 S.E.2d 868 (1966).
[Vol. 1
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